As revolutionary movements steamroll across the Middle East and North Africa, the United States cannot idly standby and hedge between liberalism and despotism. The US, as the largest and strongest global power long-representative of liberty and democracy, must take a clear and well-defined stance. The risk of standing idly by while global citizens risk their lives fighting for liberty are too great. While many of the rulers now facing strong opposition from their own people have been US allies, the United States cannot risk a future where a democracy emerges questioning why the world’s greatest symbol of democracy and freedom did not stand by their side. The future of our strategic position on the world stage and in the Middle East depends on the positions that we take today as revolution takes foot at a rapid never before seen pace. We were lucky in that Tunisia saw a fairly peaceful transition of power without the need for US participation. Our good fortune drew thinner as we hedged our bet in Egypt and waited out the departure of President Mubarak. However, the situation currently in Libya will not allow us the privilege of not taking a hard stance. How we position ourselves in Libya will greatly influence hard decisions that we will inevitably need to make as revolutions grow more tense in Bahrain, Yemen, and other countries teetering on the edge of potential chaos. Understanding the dynamics of US leadership and our role in Libya are critical to not only defining and achieving success in that country, but in sending a clear message to other countries as to where we stand and how we will react in relation to other countries.

From the front-end, it was clear that Gaddafi would not leave power without a fight. Peaceful protests leading to an eventual acquiescence of power, as occurred in Tunisia and Egypt, would not repeat itself in Libya. This was clear to anybody who has paid close attention to the  egomaniacal and abrasive leadership-style of Gaddafi, and the early warning signs of the Libyan military’s advances of opposition-held strongholds. For a period of time early in the Libya’s revolution, the opposition had momentum on their side. France was quick to recognize the opposition government that had formed in Benghazi and, alongside Britain, call for the enforcement of a no-fly zone. NATO waited almost a week after this point before even gathering to discuss possible military intervention, at which time they decided to “continue to monitor the situation.” Almost a month into the conflict, and after the momentum had shifted back to the Libyan military who had regained former opposition-held territories and had a chokehold on Benghazi, did the United Nations pass resolution 1973.

At this point, the United States took a leading role in enforcing the no-fly zone that had been called for. But the United States also failed to accomplish several important political objectives:

Defining the Justification for Military Intervention in Libya

What makes the situation in Libya different from that in Egypt and Tunisia? More importantly, what makes Libya different from Bahrain or Yemen? If violence persists in Bahrain and Yemen, for instance, will the United States military intervene? Is our hand being pushed by political pressures, media pressure, and the momentum of events? Or do we have a set of clearly defined guidelines that determine whether intervention is necessary? This is vitally critical to defining a precedent and determining how we will act with other countries (including allies) that are also facing instability popular uprising. This sends a clear message to the United States citizens making the sacrifice militarily and economically, it sends a clear message to citizens and protestors in other countries where uprisings are emergent, and it sends a clear message to the leaders of countries where uprisings are active or eminent.

Defining the Scope of Our Mission, Objectives, and What Success Looks Like

The other area where we failed was in clearly defining the scope of our military mission, objectives, and what success looks like. Granted, in such a military context the situation on the ground is so rapid and dynamic that defining these elements can prove moot in a matter of moments. Dwight Eisenhower once said, “Plans are useless, but planning is invaluable.” While the situation on the ground might rapidly alter our defined objectives and what we see as ultimate success, it is absolutely critical that there is some sort of plan exists before committing blood and treasure to a military operation. Is the military objective to oust Gaddafi and his forces? Or are simply providing air-cover to prevent and humanitarian crisis? Will we provide explicit or implicit support to the opposition should they advance on Libyan forces? Should Gaddafi remain in power, would we continue to institute this no-fly zone? Would our policy change if he didn’t leave? Would his military and strategic position change with our being there? What was the end-game? These were absolutely critical questions left unanswered.

Even more troubling, in this situation, there were different messages coming from the military and from the White House. President Obama and Secretary Clinton continued to explicitly say that is was US policy that Gaddafi leave power — a mixed message particularly when the United States is leading a military intervention in the country. Meanwhile, military commanders took a more reserved position that the United States military had no interest in driving Gaddafi out of power and that their mission was to secure and hand-off the no-fly zone. However, in the early days of the intervention it appeared the the military was taking a more aggressive stance than was expected by both the American public and the international community. In fact, the international community (particularly the Arab League) began to waver a bit after seeing how aggressive a stance we took. No matter, this could have easily been cleared up and we could have rallied unwavering support had we clearly defined the scope of our missions, the objectives, and an ultimate measure of what success would and could look like.

In Retrospect, What Should Have Been Done

While hindsight is 20/20, these failures were not the result of a lack of understanding, but rather that of political hedging. I can’t fully criticize the seemingly slow nature of our response, as the events of the last several months in the Middle East caught everybody by surprise. It was not that we didn’t recognize the angst and strife boiling in many of these despot-controlled countries, but we had no idea that citizens would be able to successfully organize using tools like Twitter and Facebook to rally in such large numbers it would put the amount of political and international pressure on these longtime leaders to step down. Policymakers around the world have been scrambling to quickly assess each country’s individual situations, their immediate and potential impact on the stability of the region, the impact of the international community’s actions on each country and on the region, and how geo-strategic interests are shifting and that impact on the global economy. Every policy decision and statement must take into account dozens of different angles, possible scenarios, and domestic as well as international consequences. It is certainly not a time to be rash.

However, from an outsider’s perspective, I believe that military intervention in Libya could have been much more swift had we played our cards differently. First off, we should have recognized immediately that Gaddafi was going to fight to the end and the potential for massacre was imminent. The first thought I had when I learned that Libya was the next domino to fall was that we had better be decisive in our positions (unlike our political posturing in Egypt weeks before), because the players involved were volatile on both sides with nothing to lose. Before even hearing the comparison in the news, I feared a repeat of a Rwanda-style massacre. Moving quicker, particularly when momentum was on the side of the opposition, would have allowed us to move in and provide air support while the opposition moved ever-closer to Tripoli to put more heat on Gaddafi and his forces.

Secondly, President Obama should have taken a clear and well-definined position and articulated that to the country and to the world. Like it or not, the United States is the largest power in the international system and the country that all others turn to for guidance in crisis. We failed to provide that leadership and guidance. The aforementioned points of defining the justification, scope, objectives, and ultimate definition of success for military intervention in Libya were left unanswered as we intervened in a country with a broad mandate from the UN. President Obama should have spoken to these points early on, instead of leaving the country and the world out of the loop as he moved troops into an offensive position. While President Obama’s speech on March, 28 served to answer some of the questions about why we acted in Libya and what it means relative to other countries where oppression exists, he continued to postpone a definition of success and withdrawal. This can only lead one to speculate that we are headed to a stalemate pending any drastic changes in the on-the-ground situation.

Moving Forward in Libya: What the United States and International Community Should Do

I’m careful when comparing US intervention in Libya to that of Iraq, but several parallels are too hard to avoid. A tyrannical (one could argue crazed) despot has attacked his own people, is tied to acts of international terrorism, is outspoken against the United States, sits on an underground sea of oil, an opposition that is relatively unknown is being rapidly thrown together, a fractured civil society, institutions tightly built around a specific leader rather than civil society, and the list goes on. The US and the international community have called-for and implemented sanctions and a no-fly zone. The situation appears to be headed toward a stalemate. The United States has led an opposition with a seemingly fractured “international coalition” under a broad UN mandate. All of these points apply aptly to both Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the current situation in Libya. Clearly, Iraq is a fresh wound in the hearts and minds of Americans and the global community — so parallels are inevitable and the world’s eyes are paying careful attention that we don’t repeat our past mistakes.

Moving forward, President Obama needs to step up and play a leadership role in the international community. He has avoided this for political reasons and because of the already wary perceptions (domestically and globally) of US intentions after Iraq and Afghanistan. But he can ameliorate this be clearly defining the points mentioned earlier. Clarity on these points will resonate across the region and in leading a unified international position. We must also ensure that our political and military objectives are in sync, both in rhetoric and practice. And we must tell the world what we need to support new governments born out of revolution: a political and economic plan moving forward, confidence that security can be held and maintained, etc. The world, and in particular the Middle East, is changing at a rapid pace. The more we can define and clearly articulate our position, the more likely it will be that we can expect broad support and smoother transitions. We need to stand up and be the voice of calm and reason, of hope and liberty that the world looks to. We have touted these principles for ages, and have in-part inspired citizens around the world to stand up for their rights and to bear the fruits of democracy and liberty. We need to decide what side of history we are going to be on, and what we will be remembered for during this historical moment.